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Abstract 
 
This paper forms part of a wider project to show the significance of archival material on 
distinguished economists, in this case Lauchlin Currie (1902-93), who studied and taught 
at Harvard before entering government service at the US Treasury and Federal Reserve 
Board as the intellectual leader of Roosevelt’s New Deal, 1934-39, as FDR’s White 
House economic adviser in peace and war, 1939-45, and as a post-war development 
economist. It discusses the uses made of the written and oral material available when the 
author was writing his intellectual biography of Currie (Duke University Press 1990) 
while Currie was still alive, and the significance of the material that has come to light 
after Currie’s death. 
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I had been closely associated with Lauchlin Currie (1902-1993) for almost twenty years, 
as student and research assistant, before formally embarking on his biography 
(Sandilands, 1990) in 1987. Though by then nearly 85, Currie was still a senior adviser to 
the Colombian government, mentally very alert, and even physically fit enough to play 
tennis daily, and at weekends to hack terraces out of a Colombian mountainside where he 
experimented with the cultivation of irises. Over the next two and a half years I was able 
to interview or write to him on any aspect of his life and work on which I needed more 
information. He also gave me carte blanche to rifle through his extensive archives. My 
working conditions while in Colombia (June 1987 – January 1988, and June – August 
1988) were close to ideal. On weekdays I occupied an office next to Currie’s in the 
Colombian Savings and Loan Institute, and at weekends I freely explored bulging 
cupboards and filing cabinets at his home.  
 
His is not a household name, even among economists, though it was not always thus. At 
the launch of the Spanish translation of my biography in Bogotá, Colombia, in November 
1990 (the English version having appeared in February), one of the speakers, Rudiger 
Dornbusch, brought with him a special message for the conference from his colleague 
Paul Samuelson. With the title ‘Tribute to Lauchlin Currie’ it read:  
 
Lauchlin Currie and Alvin Hansen, working through Marriner Eccles and Franklin 
Roosevelt, were the two economists most influential in converting the original New 
Deal from a program to reform the institutions of capitalism into a Mixed-Economy 
system of macroeconomic stabilization. Before there was a Keynesian General 
Theory, Currie was one of the stellar band of economists who urged monetary easing 
on the Federal Reserve to mitigate and prevent a devastating and unnecessary 
depression. 
 
The world owes Lauchlin Currie a great debt. Connoisseurs among scholars know 
how much economic science owes to Currie’s originality. On behalf of Harvard  
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economists everywhere, on behalf of researchers yet unborn, I proclaim Lauchlin 
Currie’s praises. Hail Caesar! Hail Nestor!  
Paul A. Samuelson, M.I.T. 
 
This was gratifying recognition of Currie’s many contributions to monetary theory, 
policy and institution-building in the 1930s.i However, Samuelson said nothing of 
Currie’s work in the White House as peace-time and war-time assistant to Franklin 
Roosevelt, 1939-45, nor of his many years as a development economist since 1949. 
Currie’s relatively low profile among mainstream “Western” economists during these 
years can perhaps be explained by two considerations.  
 
First, from early 1941 Currie was diverted from strictly economic work into wartime 
administration: as director of the lend-lease programme to China, 1941-43; as de facto 
head of the Foreign Economic Administration, 1943-44, where his work was mainly 
concerned with the procurement of strategic materials and with loan negotiations with 
British and Soviet officials; and as head of the Allied delegation to Switzerland, January-
March 1945, to secure a freeze on Nazi gold deposits in Swiss banks and to bribe the 
Swiss into denying further shipments of Nazi materiel through Switzerland to Field 
Marshal Albert Kesselring’s army in northern Italy.  
 
Second, after 1949 most of Currie’s work was based in Colombia where he was relatively 
hidden from the mainstream. Though a top adviser there, this was not the same as being 
adviser at the Fed or the White House. Also, his day-to-day advisory work meant his 
writings were either in the form of unpublished memoranda designed to influence policy 
in a timely and effective manner, or academic articles not always sufficiently refined (or 
orthodox) to be publishable in the more prestigious mainstream journals. A related 
consideration is that Currie’s reputation took a severe knock during the McCarthy era at 
precisely the time he was carving a new career in Colombia, and it suited some people to 
spread the notion that he was only there as a fugitive from justice. 
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It was my hope that a full-scale intellectual biography of Currie’s unusual career would 
help to set the record straight and highlight his many insufficiently appreciated 
contributions to political economy both in the New Deal and in the field of development 
theory and policy. 
 
Researching Currie’s early years: records and reminiscences 
 
Currie was born on October 8, 1902 in a small fishing village in Nova Scotia where his 
father had built up a substantial fleet of sailing vessels. But his father died when Currie 
was only four and his mother, a schoolteacher, moved to the nearby town of Bridgewater. 
He attended schools in Nova Scotia, apart from two years when his family stayed with 
relatives in Massachusetts and California. From 1920-22 he attended St Francis Xavier’s 
University before enrolling at the London School of Economics. There his teachers 
included Edwin Cannan, Hugh Dalton, R.H. Tawney, Sidney Webb, and Harold Laski. 
After graduating from the LSE in 1925 he moved to the PhD programme at Harvard 
where his chief inspiration was the legendary Allyn Abbott Young. His other teachers 
included Frank Taussig, John H. Williams, and T.N. Carver. Unfortunately for Currie, 
Young was lured to the LSE in 1927 to take over Edwin Cannan’s chair of political 
economy but died suddenly in March 1929 during an influenza epidemic at the early age 
of 52. Currie was scheduled to be Young’s teaching assistant in monetary economics had 
Young stayed at Harvard. Instead, John H. Williams became his formal PhD supervisor 
but his research was initially guided by Young.ii He was assistant to Young’s temporary 
replacement, Ralph Hawtrey, in 1927-28, and later to Joseph Schumpeter. His PhD 
thesis, submitted in January 1931, was on Banking Theory and Bank Assets. Here he 
exposed the fallacies of the real bills doctrine and was one of the very few who at the 
time blamed Federal Reserve Board policies for the Great Depression. His diagnosis was 
very similar to that given much later in Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz’s (1963) 
celebrated monetary history, in which, however, Currie’s contributions were ignored (see 
Laidler, 1993, and 1999, chapter 9). 
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Currie stayed at Harvard until 1934, producing important papers on monetary theory and 
policy in the Journal of Political Economy and Quarterly Journal of Economics. A book 
on The Control of the Supply of Money in the United States appeared in 1934, dedicated 
to the memory of Allyn Young. Along with Harry Dexter White, his classmate and friend 
since 1925, Currie urged radical monetary and fiscal activism, the abandonment of the 
gold standard, increased fiscal deficits and inflationary finance as an escape from 
depression.iii This did not please senior faculty members such as the department 
chairman, Harold Burbank, nor Gottfried Haberler and Joseph Schumpeter, not to 
mention Charles Bullock whom Currie described in his unpublished memoirs as ‘a 
violent reactionary, really, I believe, mentally unbalanced’. 
 
In a letter to me, June 28, 1987, Currie denounced Schumpeter as a ‘mountebank’.iv A 
biographer may nowhere find in the published record such throwaway remarks. Yet this 
kind of information can cast new light on key events and characters and breathe life into 
the history. Access to the subject’s other correspondence files, diaries and memoirs also 
helps of course; but the biographer’s own correspondence and interviews can add greatly 
to that body of informal information. Most helpful of all is the opportunity to listen to the 
subject in person and note the tone of voice: bitter or relaxed; mellow or rancorous.  
 
In the case of Schumpeter, a policy nihilist in the depths of depression, one hears Currie 
relate contemptuously how in his lectures he would suddenly stop in mid sentence, 
ostentatiously clasp his forehead, pull a paper from his pocket and scribble a note. ‘It was 
probably his laundry list,’ scoffed Currie. ‘His only solution for depression was to let 
wages fall. Other than his own, of course. He even voted to reduce the tea ladies’ wages.’ 
In similar vein Currie would rail against Herbert Hoover’s mean-minded Puritanism that 
upheld the virtues of ‘fiscal rectitude’ and balanced budgets. (The contrast to his 
reverential tone when describing Roosevelt’s character could not have been more 
marked.) Or I would hear him complain ruefully that Haberler, another policy nihilist of 
the Austrian School, voted against him in a close contest with Harry White for the 
prestigious Wells prize that would have guaranteed publication of his PhD dissertation.v 
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In these ways the real bills doctrine, the quantity theory, going off gold, deflation, 
liquidation, mass unemployment, prohibitionism, departmental rivalries and patronage, 
opportunistic Johnnies-come-lately to intellectual and social fashions (his own Harvard 
rival Seymour Harris being the most despised example), would no longer be colourless 
names or dry ideas (except the case for prohibition!).vi Instead, when struggling through a 
vast literature, I would often recall Currie’s own vibrant take on the ideas and names that 
appeared before me. Thus I could fix and organise a mass of material into a more 
coherent story than would otherwise have been possible. No doubt this also biased my 
interpretations (usually, but not always, in favour of my subject’s case), especially if 
subsequently I also had the opportunity to discuss the issues with him in person, as I 
often did. But the reader would surely get a more faithful impression of Currie’s life, 
thought, and character than through a biographer without that advantage. 
 
However, one incidental problem with writing Currie’s life at the same time as he was 
still engrossed in his current writing and advisory work was that he was constantly 
badgering me to finish work on the early years and get up to date so I could spend more 
time discussing and helping him with his current work. He was very much a man of 
action, so “the past is poison” (as he once remarked ruefully, though in a different 
context) except as it provides useful lessons for today. 
 
Naturally, the accompanying disadvantage of close association is the above-mentioned 
danger of lack of balance and an overly sympathetic, uncritical account of the subject’s 
life. The biases can be reduced by contacting the subject’s surviving friends and enemies. 
The object is to write biography not hagiography. The danger is clearly greatest, as in my 
case, when writing about an associate who is still alive and will eventually read the book. 
In this connection Charles P. Kindleberger (1991), in his Journal of Political Economy 
review of my ‘remarkable book about a remarkable economist’, commented (after 
detailing my associations with Currie since graduate days in Canada in 1967): 
The preface emphasizes that Currie has allowed Sandilands complete freedom and 
that Currie in fact welcomed criticism and called attention to weaknesses. This then is 
not hagiography. While the account of Currie’s life and work is strongly positive, 
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there is frequent mention of failures, large and small, and of frustrations and 
disappointments. 
 
On the other hand, Frank Steindl (1993), in his review for Economica, thought my 
biography too uncritical (especially where I gave a sympathetic account of Currie’s 
advice to the Fed in 1936-37, advice with which Steindl disagreed). He wrote: 
Sandilands’s forte is development economics, and so it is not surprising to find errors 
in his discussion of Currie’s monetary analysis, ones against which Currie 
inveighed... The principal shortcoming of the book, however, is that Sandilands is too 
much of a disciple. Time and again, Currie was involved in disputes of ideas and 
analyses of significant import with formidable intellects – Friedman, Harris-Todaro, 
Hirschman, Keynes, Prebisch – and, with the single exception of one issue of second-
order importance, Sandilands cannot have him being wrong! Now, of course, that is 
difficult to accept. In particular, I showed (Journal of Monetary Economics 1991) that 
Currie’s analysis advocating doubling the reserve requirements in 1936-37 was 
mistaken. 
 
I might defend myself here by noting that while Steindl’s position on this latter episode is 
the majority view, it is not shared by everyone. For example, see Lester Telser (2001) of 
the University of Chicago, whose work I discuss in Sandilands (2004, pp. 181-3).vii Be 
that as it may, here was a case where Currie had particularly strong feelings, for it was 
obviously uncomfortable to be blamed for causing a sharp increase in unemployment. We 
discussed this episode more intensively than any other from the 1930s. Naturally, I heard 
Currie’s case more forcefully than any from the other side. However, I read and presented 
plenty of criticism, even some from Currie’s close friend Walter Salant to whom I 
showed this chapter (and whom I later interviewed at the Brookings Institution). Steindl 
cannot complain that the alternative Friedman-Schwartz (1963) position was not given 
space in my book. Similarly, space was given to the views of Albert Hirschman (Currie’s 
antagonist on planning in Colombia in the early 1950s)viii, of Michael Todaro on rural-
urban migration, Raúl Prebisch on import substitution, and of the ILO and the Sussex 
School on employment strategies, so readers would be in a position to draw different 
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conclusions from mine or Currie’s. As it happens I came broadly to share Currie’s views. 
Endorsement need not be hagiography. 
 
Walter Salant was a friendly critic, and I admit to having been more inclined to contact 
Currie’s friends than his enemies, partly, however, because his friends would usually 
have had more to say or inside knowledge to impart: for the pre-Colombia (pre-1949) 
years these included Salant on the New Deal; Richard Goodwin on Currie as a teacher at 
Harvard and on his attitude toward Schumpeter; Don Patinkin on the Chicago School 
connection (and for advice on a publisher – he recommended Duke University Press, the 
publisher of his own book on the Chicago School; Patinkin, 1981); Byrd Jones on 
Currie’s work at the Fed; and the Harvard historian John Fairbank and the veteran 
columnist Joseph Alsop on wartime China. For Currie’s post-1949 Colombian career, I 
had the benefit of knowing quite well many of his close associates (and had even had 
brief meetings with two ex-Presidents, Virgilio Barco and Misael Pastrana), having spent 
12 extended periods in Colombia between 1968-90.  
 
On Currie’s work in the 1930s, Byrd Jones also sent extensive notes from his researches 
in the 1970s at the National Archives in Washington, mainly on Currie’s unpublished 
Federal Reserve Board memoranda, not all of which were among Currie’s own files in 
Bogotá. The Federal Reserve Board’s own archives contain more information on Currie’s 
work, and still more are to be found in the Marriner S. Eccles Papers in the Special 
Collections Department of the University of Utah libraries where the entry on Currie is 
the longest in the catalogue. Also useful is Princeton University’s Seeley G. Mudd 
Manuscript Library where the Jacob Viner papers include a considerable correspondence 
with Currie dating from 1932, and where the Harry Dexter White papers include the 
important paper (mentioned above and only recently brought to light) that White co-
authored with Currie and P. T. Ellsworth on anti-depression policy, January 1932 
(Laidler and Sandilands, 2002). Some twenty five of Currie’s hitherto unpublished 
memoranda on monetary theory and policy were recently published in Sandilands (2004), 
mainly from the 1930s, but with a few from his time in Colombia. They cast fresh light 
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on Currie’s influence at the Federal Reserve Board, 1934-39, but these by no means 
exhaust the extensive information about this period in Currie’s own papers.  
 
The bulk of Currie’s papers – over 31,000 items – has now been archived in Duke 
University’s Special Collections and Rare Manuscripts Library, as part of their 
Economists’ Papers Project (see Appendix). Time and resources did not allow me to visit 
the US during 1987-90 while I was writing Currie’s biography, though since then I have 
spent some time in Washington (at the Library of Congress, at Brookings, and in the FBI 
Reading Room) and in California at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University where 
most of Currie’s China papers are archived. Fortunately, Currie’s personal archive in 
Bogotá was extensive and frankly more than I could cope with properly in the time 
available for work outside my home base in Scotland. Now that these papers are almost 
all now at Duke or Stanford Universities they offer an opportunity for future biographers 
to prove David Reisman (1990) wrong when he described my effort as ‘definitive’. 
 
The Washington Years, 1934-45 
 
In June 1934, the US Treasury’s special adviser, Jacob Viner, recruited Currie, Harry 
Dexter White and others to his ‘Freshman Brain Trust’ to study specific topics related to 
the New Deal. Currie’s brief was to outline an ideal monetary system for the US. In the 
Princeton University archives is a letter from Viner to Frank Taussig, October 1934, in 
which he wrote: ‘I have had a few Harvard men working for me here, Currie, [Alan] 
Sweezy, and White, and have been very favorably impressed indeed with them, 
especially the two former. I think Currie has a tendency to dispose too summarily of 
arguments and difficulties which stand in the way of his pet ideas, but aside from this by 
no means rare shortcoming, I think he has an extraordinarily good mind.’  
 
Currie’s own correspondence files from the 1930s and 1940s are relatively thin 
(especially compared to those from early 1950, when he settled in Colombia and had less 
reason to discard files between moves), but are supplemented by the above-mentioned 
archives of correspondents such as Viner, White and Eccles. It may well be that Viner’s 
 10
comment on Currie’s ‘tendency to dispose too summarily of arguments and difficulties’ 
refers partly to the difference in their attitude to the gold standard in 1933 as an obstacle 
to more vigorously reflationist policies. Viner was one of twelve Chicago economists at 
the Harris Foundation conference in January 1932 who signed a cable to President 
Hoover recommending an increase in the free gold of the Federal Reserve System and 
expansionary open-market operations, ‘with the double aim of facilitating necessary 
government financing and increasing the liquidity of the banking system’.  
 
When in late 1933 President Roosevelt adopted his gold purchase policy with the avowed 
aim of raising the price of gold and reversing the decline in commodity prices, this was 
greeted by dozens of prominent economists with well-publicised cries of alarm and a call 
for a restoration of the gold standard ‘to restore confidence’. A letter along these lines to 
the Washington Post on November 4, 1933 was signed by five Chicago economists 
including three who had signed the Harris Foundation message in January 1932. Viner 
was not one of the Washington Post signatories, though Currie has recalled that Viner 
was also worried at that time about the implications of radical policies for the gold 
standard (which Viner wanted to maintain) and avoidance of capital flight.ix  
 
Another strong attack on Roosevelt’s monetary policies was published in the New York 
Times, November 28, 1933, signed by 38 Columbia economists. They included James 
Angell (another signatory of the earlier Harris Foundation cable), Wesley Mitchell, J M 
Clark and H P Willis. It was endorsed by the Austrian economist Fritz Machlup.x These 
attacks prompted Currie and five of his young Harvard colleagues to write to President 
Roosevelt in an open letter to the New York Times, January 25, 1934 (reproduced in 
Sandilands, 2004, p. 261), in strong support of the gold purchase policy:  
What many authorities did not realize, and what has become increasingly evident, 
was that the departure from the gold standard was an absolutely indispensable 
prerequisite to the adoption of your other policies of reform and recovery.  Otherwise, 
every proposal would have been opposed on the ground that it might endanger the 
maintenance of the gold standard.  Any fears that expressed themselves in an outflow 
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of capital and an export of gold would have been deflationary in their effects and 
would have tended to intensify and prolong the depression. 
  
Search the archives and one’s memory of conversations and there are cautionary notes: In 
a letter to Alan Sweezy (emphasis in original), August 22, 1971, Currie wrote:  
I found the famous letter! I did some head shaking over it, but anyway our hearts 
were in the right place and our instincts were right, so what more can you ask? 
Anyway, despite what Walter [Salant] says, the threat of a run on gold was present at 
that time and going off gold (a) removed that threat for the time being (b) gave the 
‘man in the street’ a feeling of bold leadership and (c) eased the gold and liquidity 
situation for many years to come.  
 
Why the head-shaking? The letter to Roosevelt concludes: 
In the foregoing paragraphs, we may seem to have dwelt unduly upon the monetary 
means for recovery and reform. This emphasis arises from the immediacy of these 
problems. We would urge in conclusion, however, that we are not believers in the 
sole efficacy of monetary measures as a cure for our economic ills. Indeed, our 
primary interest is rather in the direction of your longer range programs for reform 
and here we feel admiration for the comprehensive view you have taken of the 
economic structure.  
 
With hindsight, Currie has acknowledged that many of the regulations against big 
business, which in this letter he appears to have endorsed, were unhelpful to recovery. In 
a handwritten aide memoir for a 1987 London Weekend Television interview on the 
Great Depression (among his papers at Duke and reproduced in Sandilands, 2004), he 
wrote that the recovery programme of the Roosevelt Administration was “at first, rather 
confused and working at cross purposes. Monetary deflation continued in 1933. The 
Government sponsored a cost-inflation program called the NRA. Against all this, it had 
only a slow public works program. When NRA collapsed there was a recession. The 
mainstay was a cash deficit, but this was officially deplored.” No doubt his 1971 letter to 
Sweezy was also recalling the uneven pace of recovery, and in particular the sharp 
 12
downturn in 1937 that he blamed on a failure to understand the need to maintain a steady 
‘net Federal contribution’ to buying power. 
 
Despite or because of Currie’s forceful radicalism, Viner not only recruited Currie to his 
Freshman Brain Trust at the Treasury but also asked him to stay on as his assistant at the 
end of his initial three-month assignment. However, Currie’s request for further leave 
from Harvard was rejected. This was not unrelated to the January 1934 letter to the New 
York Times. It had incensed Harvard’s senior professors. So, with some bitterness, he 
resigned from Harvard, became a naturalised US citizen, and his three month Washington 
stint eventually lasted eleven years.  
 
At the Treasury he met and immediately hit it off with Marriner Eccles, another special 
adviser. When Eccles was appointed Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in 
November 1934 he took Currie with him as his personal assistant. Together they drafted 
the bill that became the 1935 Banking Act that converted the Fed into a true central bank 
with greatly enhanced powers, including the power to double reserve requirements on 
commercial banks should this be deemed appropriate. These powers were indeed invoked 
in 1936-37, supported by Currie, at a time when banks’ excess reserves had climbed from 
around $50 million in 1929 to $3 billion in 1936 as gold flowed in from a troubled 
Europe.  
 
The raising of reserve requirements, as a precautionary rather than a deliberately 
deflationary measure, has been widely blamed for precipitating a sharp downturn in the 
economy in 1937. Several important memoranda on this subject in the Currie archives 
illumine the continuing debate over whether monetary or fiscal influences were mainly to 
blame for the downturn. Today there is much support for the well-known view of 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) that the Fed was to blame: see, for example, Steindl 
(2004). On the other side, University of Chicago economist Lester Telser (2001 and 
2003) has, like Currie, blamed the very sharp fiscal turnaround in 1937 compared with 
1936. It may also be that the fiscal tightening was a more important (indirect) influence 
than the raising of reserve requirements on the deflation of credit and money in 1937. 
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(See also Sandilands, 2004, pp. 181-8; and the review of Steindl, 2004, in Sandilands, 
2005.)  
 
Also revealing on this whole period are Currie’s extensive correspondence files from the 
1970s and 1980s. These included correspondence surrounding the session that John 
Kenneth Galbraith organised at the New Orleans meetings of the American Economic 
Association, December 1971, on ‘The Keynesian Revolution and its Pioneers’, with 
contributions from Alan Sweezy, Byrd Jones, Robert Nathan and Leon Keyserling. Other 
correspondents included Walter Salant, Tom Humphrey and Don Patinkin. A good 
example is a letter to Paul Samuelson, May 5, 1978, in which Currie clarified the 
significance of his 1934 book on money, the contents of which Samuelson believed 
Currie had repudiated as soon as the ink was dry: 
Whoever told you that got the story a bit wrong. The book was specifically on the 
mechanism of the supply and control of money, and not on prices or incomes or the 
relative roles of money and the rate of interest. One of the chief findings was that a 
main determinant of the supply (and hence of control) was the extent of the 
indebtedness of the commercial banks of the large centers to the Fed. But by the time 
the book appeared and for a few years afterwards, the banks had an excess of reserves 
and were not in debt. My finding, valid for the 1920s and again since the late 1930s, 
ceased to be valid for some years in the 1930s, unfortunately, for me, just as the book 
was published! 
 
I would have agreed with your pragmatic attitude that the relative importance of 
money and interest rates changes with circumstances, and go even further and argue 
that under certain conditions neither may be sufficiently important to matter, which is 
why I devoted most of my time to deficit spending in the period 1934-39. The 
replenishment of the money stock in 1934-36 was helpful, as was the continuance of 
very low interest rates on riskless securities, but the “causal” factor became, for a 
time, direct spending of old and new money. I don’t imagine we would differ on that 
point. 
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During his years at the Fed, Currie became the acknowledged leader of the spending 
wing of the New Deal (see Stein, 1969, p. 165), based on pre-General Theory ideas and 
the development of statistical series on leakages and injections in the circular flow of 
income – vital for estimates of the size and composition of the federal budget required to 
arrest and reverse the depression. With this conceptual and empirical series he provided 
what may have been an original, albeit brief and informal, statement of the “balanced-
budget multiplier” concept (and on this too there is considerable retrospective discussion 
in his 1970s correspondence files, with Paul Samuelson, Walter Salant and others).xi  
 
In Federal Income-Increasing Expenditures, 1933-35, written in late 1935 or early 1936 
with Martin Krost, he reported that any similarity between the “net contribution” and the 
reported cash deficit was purely coincidental. The reported budget could be in balance 
while the net contribution was in heavy deficit. Thus there was no necessary conflict 
between those who wanted a balanced budget and those who wanted the government to 
provide a stimulus: “By selecting income-increasing types of expenditure and non-
income-decreasing methods of raising revenue, it is conceivable that a balanced budget 
could be maintained and at the same time a considerable stimulus given to business.” 
Investment subsidies, for example, could have a powerful stimulatory effect while a tax 
on undistributed profits might have only a small negative effect. However, there was no 
doubt in Currie’s mind that the conditions prevailing in the mid-1930s called for much 
more than a balanced expansion of taxes and spending.  
 
The size of the required deficit, whether in its cash or its “net contribution” form, was 
calculated according to the size of potential, full-employment income (based on 1928 
with adjustments for population and productivity growth) and the size of the leakages 
from that income that would need to be offset. If deficit finance was a precondition for 
the recovery of aggregate incomes and expenditures, it was also the main determinant of 
profits and business confidence. Strenuously opposing this view was Treasury Secretary 
Henry Morgenthau who believed that deficits destroyed business confidence. 
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In the fall of 1937, as the economy was plunging into renewed depression, Currie came to 
FDR’s personal attention when, on the urging of Harry Hopkins, the President met 
directly with Currie and two other technicians (Leon Henderson and Isador Lubin) for an 
unprecedented four-hour conference on November 8 in which “Curried-Keynesianism” 
was explained. The New York Post reported the next day that the advisers “minced no 
words in giving Roosevelt a hard-boiled review of economic conditions and with equal 
bluntness and vigor they told him that a disastrous recession can only be averted by a 
resumption of big-scale government spending.”xii As Currie later recalled in his New 
Deal memoirs (Sandilands, 2004, pp. 212-13): 
The President clearly did not understand what had happened to the recovery and was 
uncertain what to do. At this time he was receiving conflicting advice from many 
quarters. The conservatives were saying that the recession had been caused by the 
continued federal deficit (even though at that time the Federal Government was 
running a small cash surplus) and Morgenthau was influenced by their arguments. 
They also maintained that the undistributed profits tax was a factor and demanded its 
repeal. The President's faith in the basic New Deal policy of deliberately increasing a 
deficit to increase consumer buying power was obviously shaken. In any case, I 
always suspected that Roosevelt’s adherence to that policy was based more on 
humanitarian than on economic grounds, despite his statements to the contrary that 
could be quoted. He was glad to use economic arguments for something he wanted to 
do on other grounds. 
   In those circumstances Hopkins, I believe it was, said to him “Mr. President, instead 
of always talking to the heads of departments, why don't you talk to the boys who 
actually write their memos and get some first hand dope on what is after all a highly 
technical matter?” The President assented and it was arranged that Leon Henderson, 
Isidor Lubin and I should see him. James Roosevelt, who at that time was acting as 
his father's secretary, included Paul Mazur to represent the Wall Street point of view. 
The meeting was set for November 8 of 1937 and with very little advance notice I 
prepared a memorandum which was signed by three of us. Our meeting, my first with 
the President, lasted an entire afternoon and received much publicity at the time. 
Unfortunately, the inclusion of Mazur led to much internal disagreement among the 
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“experts” and the President was again presented with conflicting views. I retained the 
objective of a balanced budget for 1939 since the fiscal year did not begin until the 
middle of 1938, and I had various ideas how the budget could be technically balanced 
while continuing a cash deficit. 
   The President was obviously very much interested in our meeting and, as always, 
took a vigorous part in the discussion. I was presented for the first time (although not 
the last) with the task of reconciling my great respect for the President, which would 
have led me to keep quiet, and my anxiety to make my point, which impelled me to 
break in and even differ, as respectfully as I could. That I succeeded in this 
reconciliation reasonably well in my first meeting was indicated by the President's 
reaction when my name was suggested to him as one of his new assistants in 1939: 
“Currie? I remember him well. He can disagree with one without getting red in the 
face and pounding the table.” 
   Little tangible resulted from this meeting although probably it had its value in being 
part of the process by which the President finally made up his mind. Two days later 
Morgenthau made his then famous budget balancing speech, which, in the 
circumstances of the times, was widely hailed as a victory for the conservative point 
of view, particularly in his reference to the Government’s future reliance on “the 
driving force of private initiative”. With little objection from the Administration, 
Congress proceeded to repeal the undistributed profits tax. The only recovery 
measures we advocated that were promptly adopted related to housing, and this was 
in large part attributable to Eccles’ brilliant manoeuvre in having them accepted and 
recommended by a distinguished committee of private citizens (see [Marriner 
Eccles’s] Beckoning Frontiers, 1951, 302-303). 
   As Eccles says in his book, both he and the New Deal program for achieving 
recovery appeared, in the closing days of 1937, to be in the dog house. Since he was 
indisposed to try to see the President again for the moment, I decided that the most 
useful thing I could do was to re-examine the course of events leading up to the 
recession and present an explanation as well documented as I could make it. The 
resulting memorandum, on the Causes of the Recession was mimeographed and 
widely circulated and read in New Deal circles.xiii It probably had as much influence 
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as anything I wrote in the Government. Although it was the fashion to accuse the 
Roosevelt Administration of favoring a planned society I argued that our current 
difficulties arose from the absence of careful planning. The juxtaposition of the 
payment of the veterans’ bonus of $1.7 billion in 1936 (passed over the President’s 
veto) and the beginning of collections of Social Security taxes in 1937 was wholly 
fortuitous and unplanned. The tremendous and highly disrupting wave of 
inventorying and then disinventorying was similarly unplanned as was also the 
excessive advance in building costs. 
   While this memorandum did much to restore or strengthen faith in the necessity of 
planning and for the Government to assume more active responsibility for the course 
of economic activity it left me dissatisfied with my own failure to forecast the 
severity of the recession well in advance of its occurrence. It was hindsight rather 
than foresight. It was particularly aggravating because I was aware at the time of the 
drastic fall in the excess of government expenditures over receipts, of the rise in 
building costs and of the probable excess of production over consumption, the 
difference going into inventories. I became aware of the chief mental hazard attached 
to forecasting – the reluctance to take a strong stand that business is going to be very 
different than it actually is. I think that in part this reluctance arises not only from a 
fear of being wrong, but also from an implicit awareness of the absence of reliable 
and current quantitative data. In the then state of our economic data, one naturally 
hesitated in taking a strong position which went contrary to existing trends. 
 
Morgenthau continued to oppose proposals to increase deficit spending, but a few months 
later Roosevelt finally swung in favour of the spenders and the economy pulled out of 
recession in late spring 1938.  
 
It is widely believed that J. M. Keynes was the key figure in altering attitudes toward the 
proper role of government in securing full employment in a mainly free enterprise US 
economy, greatly aided, after 1937, by Alvin Hansen’s famous fiscal policy seminar at 
Harvard (conducted jointly with John H Williams, and attended by the likes of Paul 
Samuelson, Lorie Tarshis, James Tobin and John Kenneth Galbraith), together with 
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Hansen’s later, equally famous Guide to Keynes (1954). The Currie papers appear to 
uphold Galbraith’s view that Currie has a claim to precedence, at least relative to 
Keynes’s General Theory (1936), as an intellectual influence on New Deal 
macroeconomic activism. In an essay on ‘How Keynes Came to America’, Galbraith 
(1971, p. 48) noted that ‘Currie failed of promotion at Harvard partly because his ideas, 
brilliantly anticipating Keynes, were considered to reflect deficient scholarship until 
Keynes made them respectable’. However, the archives reveal that Currie was critical of 
The General Theory when it appeared. Nevertheless, he was happy to invoke its authority 
in support of policies he advocated on somewhat different intellectual and empirical 
grounds (the influence of Allyn Youngxiv was at least as great as that of the early 
Keynes); and he teamed up with Alvin Hansen to defend activist fiscal policy in their 
joint testimony before the Temporary National Economic Committee in May 1939 
(Sandilands, 1990, 83-7). 
 
In the White House in Peace and War, 1939-45 
 
In June 1939 President Roosevelt phoned the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. 
Marriner Eccles (1951, p. 333) recorded the conversation thus: 
“Marriner, I guess you are going to give me hell.” 
Without knowing what he had in mind, I replied: “Mr. President, I do not know what 
good it would do to give you hell, even if I wanted to.” 
“Well,” he explained, “I am going to steal Lauch Currie from you. I need him here as 
one of my assistants.” He quickly baited the hook. 
“I am sure you will realize,” he continued, “that it is not such a bad thing after all as 
far as the Board and you are concerned. You, of course, see the advantages at once of 
having a friend in court who can represent and speak for your point of view.” 
 
Thus in July 1939 Currie joined the White House staff as the President’s administrative 
assistant for economic affairs, a post created in the 1939 Government Reorganization Act 
as drafted by Charles Merriam and Louis Brownlow. One of the chief qualifications laid 
down for these advisory posts was ‘a passion for anonymity’.xv An interesting example of 
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the need for this uncommon passion arose in connection with a March 1940 
memorandum on unemployment statistics that he prepared for the President. As Currie 
recalled this work in his unpublished memoirs (Currie, 1953, pp. 154-7):   
There are probably very few writings on economic matters by Roosevelt extant that 
are unquestionably his own and reflect his own habits of thought, since the great bulk 
of them are the result of the collaboration or work of technicians. I happen to have 
one addressed to me, which is indubitably his own. It reflects so faithfully his 
particular habit of reasoning from the particular to the general, and throws such an 
amusing light on his attitude toward his own experts, that it is worth quoting in full. 
In the Spring of 1940 Dorothy Thompson and Arthur Krock presented estimates of 
unemployment considerably lower than the official government estimates and this 
touched off a great controversy. Assuming, of course, that the President was on “our” 
side and perhaps mildly interested, I sent him a brief memorandum on March 14, 
1940 setting forth briefly the basis of the then official estimates of unemployment of 
between 8.5 and 11.2 million and deriding the unacknowledged source of Krock’s 
estimates, an economist of the Dupont Company.  
 
To Currie’s complete surprise he received back from the President a lengthy 
memorandum expressing scepticism toward all the official estimates and concluding that 
unemployment was no more than six million. For example, the President asked: ‘Are the 
thousands of women who habitually take a month or six-week job in a retail store around 
Christmas time unemployed when the census taker arrives in April?' and ‘Is my friend the 
skilled carpenter unemployed because temperamentally he cannot keep a job for more 
than two weeks – always having a row with his employer or his fellow workmen?’ He 
also asked if his well digger at Hyde Park is unemployed ‘even if he makes enough 
money in two or three months to last him the rest of the year’. After several similar 
examples, Roosevelt wrote that it seemed that ‘what we mean by unemployed in this 
country are unemployed people who are eager to work and who really need work in order 
to feed, clothe and house themselves and their families’, and he did not believe that ‘there 
are more than six million people in this country who fall into this category’. Already 
there were four million of these people receiving state aid, so only two million ‘ought to 
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have work provided for them in some way as a social and economic need. That’s not bad 
at all.’ 
 
‘Needless to say,’ wrote Currie in his memoirs, ‘I guarded this memorandum carefully as 
a mere intimation of its contents at that time would have been a political bombshell.’ He 
composed a careful reply that classified the President’s examples and defended the 
official estimates. He wrote that he heard no further on the matter. ‘I don’t imagine that 
my reasoning carried conviction, as it was probably too abstract for the President, but at 
least it intimidated him so that he never expressed his heretical views in public.’ This of 
course is another illustration of the importance of archival material for economic and 
political historians. Currie wrote that the President’s memorandum (a copy of which is 
presumably in the National Archives, though I know of no reference to it in the literature) 
‘illustrates both his down-to-earth practical type of thinking, and also the weakness of 
this method to solve certain types of economic problems.’  
 
Another example of Currie’s many efforts to educate Roosevelt came in a memorandum 
on full employment submitted to the President on April 27.xvi The preface read: 
1. It represents the progress to date of a line of investigation I initiated at the 
Reserve Board and which is today being carried on by the brilliant group of 
young economists in Harry Hopkins’ office. The basic analysis is that of J. M. 
Keynes. Since Professor Hansen and I testified along these lines before the 
TNEC, it has become generally the New Deal economists’ diagnosis of and 
prescription for our economic problem. 
2. I have come to suspect that you are somewhat bothered by the apparent 
conflict between the humanitarian and social aims of the New Deal and the 
dictates of “sound economics”. I feel convinced that in place of conflict there 
is really complete harmony and for that reason only the New Deal can solve 
the economic problem. 
3. I think you should know the basic economic theory that underlies the 
suggestions and positions taken by your assistant. In treating special problems 
I have the basic problem and solutions, as I see it, constantly in mind and 
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although feasibility and timing must always be given proper weight, I try to fit 
every specialized problem into the broad program. 
4. In connection with the pressure currently being brought on you to call a 
Conference on Unemployment, my view is very naturally that unless the 
conference can come out with the diagnosis and type of solution outlined in 
the attached memorandum it will be fruitless and probably harmful. Unless 
very carefully selected and stage managed, the likelihood of its so coming out 
is not promising. 
5. You asked me to do some work on the problem of post-war reconstruction. 
This problem is, however, but one special case of the overall problem of 
securing and maintaining full employment. 
 
In conclusion, let me say that I don’t for a moment think that this type of analysis can 
be sold politically. Its value lies solely in the proper orientation of our own thinking 
in developing a coordinated program. The program itself, I think, must be sold on the 
specific appeal of its component elements. 
 
The memorandum is long but even so is greatly compressed. I should be delighted to 
go into greater detail on any points that you think are crucial and “unproven”. After 
having had to interview and read the outpourings of numberless cranks and crackpots, 
I feel a little abashed at coming forward and saying, “I know the answer”. I trust, 
however, that you will make the distinction! 
  
So here are examples of the anonymous backroom advisor quietly informing, educating, 
persuading and protecting – as the technician (who once described himself as ‘inflexibly 
unenthusiastic’ in a 1941 interview) rather than the politician. However, the anonymity 
rule could not always apply, and Currie’s name, photograph, and even cartoon image 
appeared from time to time in national newspapers and magazines. Shortly after Currie’s 
first official mission to China, Eliot Janeway wrote, in a Time magazine article (May 5, 
1941) on Roosevelt’s diplomatic war against Hitler: 
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China affords the most concrete example of how Roosevelt proposes to win this 
[diplomatic] war. Last summer, after the Fall of France, Britain again started 
appeasing Japan by closing the Burma Road. Chiang Kai-shek asked himself whether 
the democracies understood in whose interests he was fighting… Then, with 
characteristic diplomatic indirection, word trickled through to Chungking that it 
might be profitable to invite Lauchlin Currie, one of the President’s most anonymous 
administrative assistants, to come to China. Currie, the No. 1 U. S. disciple of John 
Maynard Keynes, is also the No. 1 New Deal economist. He is not a politician. He 
has the immense prestige, so important in China of a scholar, moreover, a scholar 
who has taught at Harvard. He has the confidence of the President. He was the perfect 
choice… 
 
Chiang agreed to call off the civil war long enough to sound out America’s latest 
emissary… What could he lose? If Currie had just come to talk friendship, Chiang 
would find it out when Currie returned to the States. In that case, he could go back to 
feuding… 
 
Currie’s ostensible mission was to give China a budget. But the central government 
has no income to speak of. It simply prints notes… The average peasant pays 60% of 
his income (cash and crop) in rent. In return, the landlords, mainly militarists, are 
supposed to give the peasants police protection. But the militarists pay almost no 
taxes to Chiang’s government. To make his budget, Currie apparently argued that 
Chiang should stop being a front man for the landlords, and to take them into 
partnership instead, i.e., tax their incomes. Some of the income could then be routed 
back to the commodity-starved peasants via a benefit program. Thus inflation, 
hoarding, the feudal independence of the landlords and the political orphanhood of 
the peasants would all be attacked at once. It dawned on the Generalissimo that he 
could overnight become a popular leader on the Roosevelt model if he let the peasants 
feel that the nationalist war, in addition to being a war for China’s freedom, was also 
a war for social justice. 
 
 23
One question remained unanswered: could the professor deliver? Until the Chinese 
knew that, his ideas were merely something to think about. But deliver he did. Four 
days after Currie’s return, the President made his speech to the White House 
correspondents about his plans under the Lend-Lease Act. “China expresses the 
magnificent will of millions of plain people to resist the dismemberment of their 
nation. China, through the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, asks our help. America 
has said that China shall have our help.” 
 
Thus China was added to America’s Lend-Lease programme and Currie put in charge of 
its administration (as well as the development of the Flying Tigers programme for China 
under the command of General Claire Chennault, with authority to arrange for the release 
of planes and US airmen). In the event, Chiang had little interest in a New Deal for 
China’s peasants but the Lend-Lease programme served US and democratic interests by 
helping to keep China in the war against Japan. After the defeat of Japan it was not long 
before Chiang’s corrupt Nationalist government met its almost inevitable overthrow by 
Mao’s communist army in 1949. Currie was one of the ‘China Hands’ who was then 
blamed for ‘losing’ China during a rising tide of anti-communist hysteria. A full account 
of Currie’s involvement in China policy, 1941-43, and his work as de facto head of the 
Foreign Economic Administration, 1943-44, is in Sandilands (1990, chapter 4). Currie’s 
role in China is also dealt with in a major new biography of Mao Zedong by Jung Chang 
and Jon Halliday (2005), partly based on papers supplied to Chang and Halliday from my 
own archive. 
 
From Grand Alliance to Cold War 
 
Currie’s wartime role in foreign economic affairs was to come under intense scrutiny 
soon after Roosevelt’s death on April 1945. The Roosevelt administration had been 
assiduously promoting good relations with the Soviet ally and hoped that the close 
wartime cooperation would be continued postwar. Currie had been intimately involved in 
negotiations with the Soviets over wartime loans and their participation at Bretton Woods 
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in late 1944 when it was still hoped that they would join the new multilateral institutions 
being established there.xvii 
   
Another of Currie’s official involvements with the Soviets followed upon his high-profile 
assignment in January 1945 as head of an allied delegation to Bern to persuade the Swiss 
to block Nazi gold stored in Swiss banks and to prohibit further shipments through 
Switzerland of materiel for Kesselring’s forces in Italy. Currie’s personal memoirs (in a 
transcript of some oral history tapes), refer to his last interview with President Roosevelt 
upon his return from Switzerland in March 1945. The Swiss President had asked Currie 
to convey a private message to President Roosevelt that the Swiss were disturbed by their 
very poor relations with the Soviets, and that ‘they would appreciate it very much if 
Roosevelt would use his good offices to prepare the way for a better relation, to stop the 
attacks by the Moscow press on them as they would like to establish diplomatic 
relations’. (The Swiss feared their own interests were under threat with the Soviet 
advance into Central Europe.) Roosevelt said, ‘I don’t think I’d better give in the idea 
officially. You know everybody in the Swiss Embassy and in the Soviet Embassy.’ 
Currie then mentioned having met the Soviet cultural attaché. Roosevelt said splendid, 
and urged Currie to make the appropriate connections himself, informally, since ‘he was 
confident that what had to be done surely had to come from me’.  
 
The ‘Soviet cultural attaché’ actually turned out to be the Soviets’ chief KGB officer in 
the Washington Embassy, Anatoly Gorsky. Many of Gorsky’s wartime coded cables to 
Moscow were later partially decrypted by the National Security Agency, some as early as 
1946 or 1947. This work, now famously known as the ‘Venona’ project, was top secret 
until the release of some 2900 decrypted cables in 1995-96. Persons mentioned in these 
cables were scrutinised during the Cold War for evidence that their involvement with the 
Soviets was espionage rather than part of their official duties. Currie and his old friend 
Harry Dexter White were among those mentioned in the cables and both came to very 
public attention when in 1948 their names were mentioned by ex-Soviet agent Elizabeth 
Bentley in open testimony before the House Committee on Un-American Activities 
(HUAC). Though she had never met them herself, she claimed that White and Currie had 
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passed on information to other Washington economists who were consciously abetting 
her own espionage activities. Currie and White both demanded to appear before HUAC 
to rebut these charges. White, in particular, caused a sensation with his robust handling of 
pointed questions from Congressman Richard Nixon. Their testimony appeared to satisfy 
the Committee at that time, though the strain contributed to the fatal heart attack that 
White suffered on his way home from the hearings.xviii  
 
Currie’s memoirs remind us that much diplomacy is of necessity covert and that official 
US-Soviet relations between 1941-45 were totally different from those that prevailed 
during the cold war. Roosevelt’s reluctance to be seen to be interceding personally in the 
Swiss-Soviet affair may have been related to two big issues concerning the Russians at 
that time (March 1945). Firstly, he was having trouble with the press and Congress over 
proposed voting rights for the Soviet Union in the United Nations Assembly. Secondly, 
and relevant to Swiss-Soviet relations, was the bitter protest that Stalin had lodged when 
he learned of the secret feelers that the Germans had recently initiated in Bern with 
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) agent Allen Dulles (whom Currie had himself met in 
Bern) to discuss the possibility that Kesselring might negotiate the separate surrender of 
the German forces in Italy. Stalin demanded to know why the Soviets had been excluded 
from these talks. He feared that a separate peace with America and Britain would leave 
the Germans free to continue war with Russia. Roosevelt was able to assuage Stalin’s 
fears, and in a personal letter to Churchill from Warm Springs on April 11, 1945, the day 
before he died, Roosevelt wrote: 
   I would minimise the general Soviet problem as much as possible because these 
problems, in one form or another, seem to arise every day and most of them straighten 
out as in the case of the Bern meeting.  
   We must be firm, however, and our course thus far is correct. (Freidel, 1990, p. 602) 
 
Currie left his position at the White House in June 1945 to go into business as an 
economic consultant in New York until he was recruited by the World Bank to head a 
comprehensive country study of Colombia in 1949-50. His mission report was published 
in September 1950 at which point the Colombian government appointed him as advisor 
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to a committee set up to study the report and act on its recommendations (Sandilands, 
1990; Alacevich, 2005). Thus began a new career as a development economist in 
Colombia that would stretch for more than 40 years. It is beyond my current remit to 
review this period in any depth but, as Alacevich has shown by delving into just one brief 
episode in Currie’s career in Colombia, there is a wealth of information on this career in 
the voluminous memoranda, manuscripts, memoirs and letters now archived at Duke 
University. These show that Currie was active almost uninterruptedly as a top-level 
presidential adviser and development economist right up to his death, aged 91, in 
December 1993.  
When as a naturalized U.S. citizen he attempted to renew his passport in the poisonous 
atmosphere of 1954, this was refused, ostensibly on the grounds that he was now residing 
abroad. However, the reality was probably connected with the ‘Venona’ project and other 
allegations about his wartime involvements in China and with the Russians. He had 
recently married a Colombian and was settled in Colombia despite a military coup in 
1953 that caused him to retire temporarily from his economic advisory work. Instead he 
devoted himself to the raising of Holstein cattle on a farm outside Bogotá.   
With the return of civilian government in 1958, President Alberto Lleras personally 
conferred Colombian citizenship upon him and he returned to full-time advisory work for 
a succession of presidents. However, between 1966 and 1971 he served as a visiting 
professor in North American and British universities: Michigan State (1966), Simon 
Fraser, Canada (1967-1971), Glasgow (1968-1969), and Oxford (1969). He returned 
permanently to Colombia in May 1971 at the personal behest of President Misael 
Pastrana to prepare a national plan of development known as the Plan of the Four 
Strategies, with focus on the ‘leading sectors’ of urban housing and export 
diversification. (On Currie’s theory of leading sectors see Chandra, 2006). The plan was 
implemented, and the institutions that were established in support of the plan played a 
major role in accelerating Colombia's urbanization. 
  
For most of his professional life Currie has been an eclectic mixture of economic liberal 
and economic planner. Understanding the cultural and intellectual roots of this admixture 
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requires much more than a reading of his published output. We need to know how his 
writing is influenced by upbringing, training, personal characteristics and experience, 
both personal and professional; and the constraints of time and place. This is what makes 
a wide-ranging archive so invaluable. On the eclecticism of his planning and advisory 
work in light of that experience, Currie best summed up his approach at a conference in 
Panama in 1975 (as reported in Sandilands, 1990, p. 372):  
Although I have a great respect for the power of economic incentives and the efficacy 
of decentralized decision making, I am still an inveterate planner. Despite my good 
intentions, the State reappeared, but I hope in acceptable collaboration with the use of 
economic incentives. The “invisible hand” became two hands, the traditional one 
working more or less silently through economic incentives, and the more visible one 
of national economic policy making. The resulting strategy is a mixed one, difficult to 
classify. I distrust labels. Personally, I would not call myself a monetarist nor a 
Keynesian, nor a believer in intervention nor the market, nor a structuralist nor a neo-
classicist but a little of all of these, and am prepared to use policies involving 
elements of all these approaches when the attainment of certain goals appears to make 
their use appropriate. 
Currie remained as chief economist at the National Planning Department for ten years, 
1971-81, followed by twelve years at the Colombian Institute of Savings and Housing 
until his death in 1993. There he doggedly defended the unique housing finance system 
(based on “units of constant purchasing power” for both savers and borrowers) that he 
had established in 1972. The system thus continued to boost Colombia’s growth rate and 
urban employment opportunities year by year. Currie was also a distinguished urban 
planner and played a major part in the first United Nations Habitat conference in 
Vancouver in 1976. His ‘cities-within-the-city’ urban design and financing proposals 
(including the public recapture of land’s socially created ‘valorización’, or ‘unearned land 
value increments’, as cities grow) were elaborated in his Taming the Megalopolis (1976). 
He was a regular teacher at the major universities in Bogotá and published widely in 
international journals. His writings were heavily influenced by his Harvard mentor Allyn 
Young. A paper on Youngian endogenous growth theory was published posthumously 
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(Currie, 1997), pieced together by the present writer from several incomplete drafts, notes 
and tabulations that were on his desk when he died, and that are now among his papers at 
Duke University. On the day before he died, of heart failure, President Cesar Gaviria 
presented him with Colombia's highest honor, the Gran Cruz de Boyacá, for services to 
his adopted country.  
Appendix 
 
Archives of Papers of Lauchlin Currie 
 
The main archive of Currie’s papers is in the Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special 
Collections Library, Duke University, under the title ‘Lauchlin Bernard Currie Papers, 
1931-1994 and n.d. (bulk 1950-1990)’. The extent is currently 60.35 linear feet and 
31,370 items. Before the originals were shipped from Bogotá to Duke, most were first 
photocopied under the direction of Elba Cánfora of the Universidad Nacional de 
Colombia, thanks to a major grant from the Banco de la República, for deposit in 
Colombia’s Luis Angel Arango Library in Bogotá. For details of the Duke collection see 
http://scriptorium.lib.duke.edu/cgi-bin/nph-dweb/dynaweb/findaids/currie. 
 
Currie’s papers are part of Duke University’s ‘Economists’ Papers Project’ 
(http://scriptorium.lib.duke.edu/economists). This growing collection includes the papers 
of Kenneth Arrow, William Baumol, Arthur Bloomfield, Martin Bronfenbrenner, Jesse 
Chickering, Robert Clower, Max Corden, Lauchlin Currie, Paul Davidson, Evsey Domar, 
Frank Fetter, Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, W M Gorman, Earl Hamilton, Clifford 
Hildreth, Homer Jones, Juanita Morris Kreps, Axel Leijonhufvud, H Gregg Lewis, Carl 
Menger, Karl Menger, Lloyd Metzler, Franco Modigliani, Oskar Morgenstern, Douglass 
C North, Don Patinkin, Mark Perlman, Benjamin Ratchford, Albert Rees, Tibor 
Scitovsky, Martin Shubik, Vernon L Smith, Joseph Spengler, Wolfgang F Stolper, and 
Sidney Weintraub. 
 
Currie’s China papers are archived at the Hoover Institution of War, Revolution and 
Peace, Stanford University, under the title, ‘Register of the Lauchlin Bernard Currie 
Papers, 1941-1993’. The extent is 5 manuscript boxes and 1 envelope of photos, and is 
summarised in the catalogue as: ‘Correspondence, notes, memoranda, reports, and 
summaries of interviews, relating to American aid to China during World War II, 
conditions in China, and military operations in the China-Burma-India Theater.’ See 
http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/tf2779n58h. 
 
The Marriner Eccles papers at the Marriott Library, University of Utah include a large 
number of letters and memoranda from Currie. His is the largest single entry in the 
catalogue. See: http://www.lib.utah.edu/spc/mss/ms178/178.html.  
See also material on Eccles and Currie in the records of the Federal Reserve Board that 
are located in the U. S. National Archives at 
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http://www.archives.gov/research_room/federal_records_guide/federal_reserve_system_r
g082.html#82.1. 
 
                                                 
Notes 
 
i A few years earlier, one of Samuelson’s Harvard teachers, Wassily Leontief, was passing 
through Bogotá. He told his minders that there were only two institutions he wanted to visit: the 
famous gold museum and Lauchlin Currie. (This, at least, is how Currie told the story to me.) 
 
ii Currie visited Young in London in the summer of 1928 while collecting information on English 
banks. A moving letter from Currie to Young’s widow in March 1929 was uncovered after my 
biography appeared, and is reproduced in Sandilands (1999) – and in the next chapter of this 
volume – in an article on Young’s influence as a teacher. That article benefited greatly from my 
access to Charles Blitch’s archive on Young that he had built up for his biography (Blitch, 1995).  
 
iii Currie, White and Paul Theodore Ellsworth wrote a long memorandum on anti-depression 
policy in January 1932 that was later discovered among White’s papers in the Princeton 
University archives. It was then published (Currie, White and Ellsworth, 2002) with a foreword 
by Laidler and Sandilands (2002) explaining its significance and possible influence on what has 
sometimes been considered the ‘unique’ Chicago tradition in monetary theory and policy. 
 
iv In a letter dated 16 October 2004, Mark Perlman told me of a similar judgment from Paul 
Samuelson who ‘launched into a vehement anti-Schumpeter speech at the 1980 International 
Economic Association Congress in which he denominated JAS as a mountebank and a hollow 
show-off’. 
 
v In Sandilands (2004), three chapters of Currie’s PhD thesis – on the theory of banking and 
control of the business cycle – were finally published.  
 
vi He often revealed his animus against Irving Fisher, the famous champion of prohibition – and 
Currie’s diary for 1926-27 records several visits to illegal bootleggers with his Harvard 
classmates. Apart from disliking his Puritanism, Currie complained that the conservative Fisher 
was a monetary reformer mainly because he hoped that those measures would make broader 
government action unnecessary. He criticised Fisher’s ‘transactions’ version of the quantity 
theory as simplistic and misleading, and found his frequent crusading visits to the Fed irritating 
and time-wasting. Nevertheless, Fisher had a high regard for Currie and I learned  later (from 
Steindl, 1993) that he took credit for getting him appointed to the White House as Roosevelt’s 
assistant for economic affairs. I think Currie would take that claim with a pinch of salt.  
 
vii Concerning this 2004 publication of some of Currie’s memoranda from the 1930s and beyond, 
Telser wrote me on January 9, 2005:  
I have been reading and learning from Lauchlin Currie from your Journal of Economic Studies. 
It has very important material so that I hope you can get it read by the right people. I am going 
to bring it to the attention of some of my colleagues. Especially striking to me are the essays I 
have read so far on deposits and the 100 percent reserve plan. People like Douglas Diamond, 
Calomaris, Friedman, Neil Wallace, Peltzman et al. who have studied bank runs and panics are 
woefully ignorant of the facts. Bob Solow should get a copy of your journal. He wrote me a 
very perceptive letter on my veterans' bonus piece and I am sure would welcome your work on 
Currie... Congratulations!  
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viii Michele Alacevich spent the summer of 2004 in the Duke archives researching Currie’s World 
Bank mission to Colombia, 1949-50, and its follow-up, including the period in 1951-53 during 
which he and Hirschman worked in uneasy partnership (Alacevich, 2005). I am also indebted to 
Alacevich for unearthing in the archives of the University of Milan the Italian text of an otherwise 
unknown lecture that Currie gave to the Instituto di Studi Internazionali, Milan, on March 5, 
1946, while president of the board of the Council of Italian-American Affairs, on ‘Italy in the 
Postwar World’, in which he urged the importance of Italy’s democratic integration into the 
world economy and the need to avoid an overvalued exchange rate.  
 
ix Personal communication and as indicated in comments on Viner in Currie’s (1990, p. 13) 
recollections of Allyn Young: Young did support the gold standard, but Currie wrote that he 
‘would immediately have seen the fallacy of composition in the argument of the budget 
balancers. The logic of his 1928 Economic Journal article would have led him to stress the role of 
demand and the ultimate consumer and to downgrade the independent role of ‘confidence’ in 
itself rather than as a reflection of demand... But he might have felt, with Viner, that a deliberate 
unbalancing of the budget might have resulted in a flight of capital.’  
    Similarly, in a letter to J Ronnie Phillips, July 27, 1993, commenting on a draft of Phillips’s 
book on the ‘Chicago Plan’ for monetary reform (Phillips, 1995), in which Currie’s 1934 
proposal for a 100 percent reserve banking system was discussed, Currie wrote that ‘Viner was a 
very able economist but not very daring… I doubt if he passed my paper [on the 100 percent 
reserves plan] to Morgenthau, who was also timid’.   
 
x I am indebted for this information to Hansjoerg Klausinger, working on Machlup’s archives, 
and to Masazumi Wakatabe who sent me the Washington Post and New York Times letters. 
 
xi The original formal mathematical statement of the balanced-budget multiplier theorem was by 
Walter Salant’s brother William while he was an assistant to Currie in the early 1940s. In various 
unpublished memoranda written in the late 1970s, Currie again questioned the practical relevance 
of the theorem, and also criticised its assumption that a rise in the tax rate would have no effect 
on the marginal propensity to save or, as Currie would prefer to express it, on the marginal 
propensity to hold money in the face of a need to replenish depleted cash balances. In the latter 
case the value of any multiplier effect would be far less than unity. 
 
xii Extracts of the report that was laid before the President are included in ‘Editor’s Introduction’ 
(Sandilands, 2004, pp. 185-6). The full report and contemporary newspaper commentaries are in 
the Currie archive at Duke University.  
xiii This was subsequently published, with an introduction by Byrd Jones, in Currie (1980). 
 
xiv For Young’s influence on Currie’s monetary economics see Sandilands (1990, chapter 2) and 
Laidler (1993, pp. 1083-4); and for his influence on Currie’s thinking on development economics 
see Currie (1997) and Mehrling and Sandilands (1999, p. xi). 
 
xv Currie was the first professional economist to work as a presidential adviser in the White 
House. The Employment Act of 1946 formalised this role with the creation of the Council of 
Economic Advisers. One of Currie’s postgraduate students at Simon Fraser University, 1967-68, 
was Martin Neil Baily who was appointed by President Clinton as Chairman of the CEA in 1999. 
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xvi Currie’s memoirs record that he finished this 18-page memorandum (plus nine charts) on 
March 18, but that he quietly ‘kept it on my desk until April 27 when I finally submitted it with 
apologies for its length. Apparently the ostensible occasion was agitation for a National 
Conference on Unemployment, which could easily have turned into an attack on New Deal 
policies.’ Part of this memorandum was reproduced in Sandilands (2004, pp. 366-8). 
 
xvii A revealing insight into contemporary attitudes toward the Soviets and hopes for continued 
economic and political cooperation after the war, is given by the erstwhile Assistant Secretary of 
State, Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision (October 1944). Currie was close to Welles from 
the summer of 1940 when they were both involved in embargo policies against Japan. Currie’s 
memoirs (Currie, 1953, pp. 152-3) record that Welles was ‘unquestionably one of the most 
competent persons I encountered in Government’ and that he ‘could understand why the 
President always preferred to deal with Welles [rather than Secretary Cordell Hull] when he 
could’. Currie contrasted Welles’s ‘competence and forcefulness’ with Hull’s ‘jealousy and 
vindictiveness’ that eventually forced Welles’s resignation in August 1943. 
 
xviii For an examination of the evidence against Currie and White (concluding that both were 
innocent of espionage), see Sandilands (2000), James Boughton (2001), and Boughton and 
Sandilands (2003). After reading the latter paper, Major-General Julius Kobyakov, deputy 
director of the KGB’s American desk in the late 1980s, wrote to me on December 22, 2003 to 
confirm our conclusions. After extensive archival research on Soviet intelligence in the U.S. in 
the 1930s and 1940s he found that ‘there was nothing in [Currie’s] file to suggest that he had ever 
wittingly collaborated with the Soviet intelligence… However, in the spirit of machismo, many 
people claimed that we had an ‘agent’ in the White House. Among the members of my profession 
there is a sacramental question: ‘Does he know that he is our agent?’ There is very strong 
indication that neither Currie nor White knew that.’  
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